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HOW TO SALVAGE ARTICLE I: THE CRUMBLING
FOUNDATION OF OUR REPUBLIC
DAVID SCHOENBROD*
I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America
and the republic for which it stands . .. I
Article I is the first article of the Constitution because it was
to be the foundation of our republic. "Republic" means the
people's government rather than that of a king or an oligarchy.2
To make the federal government a republic, Article I assigns
the power to decide the overarching issues of policy to a legis-
lature whose members are supposed to be accountable to the
people. The members of this legislature, Congress, would
therefore bear personal responsibility to the people for the con-
sequences of these pivotal decisions. This responsibility would
tend to link the actions of the federal government to the inter-
ests of the people.
As I will argue, this linkage remained strong for over a century
and a half-indeed grew stronger as the electorate came to in-
* Trustee Professor of Law, New York Law School. As this Article builds upon
my recent book, DC Confidential: Inside the Five Tricks of Washington, I owe a debt of
gratitude to those who helped me with the book. DAVID SCHOENBROD, DC CON-
FIDENTIAL: INSIDE THE FIVE TRICKS OF WASHINGTON 229-31 (2017). For help specif-
ically with this Article, I owe a special debt to the leadership of the Federalist So-
ciety's Artide I Initiative and the fellow participants therein. For thoughtful
research assistance on this Article, I thank, Nicole Jolicoeur and Laura Rion, New
York Law School class of 2017.
1. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
2. Republic, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/republic [https://perma.cc/G9NZ-Y38Z].
3. These primary issues of policy are enumerated in Article I, Section 8. The
Constitution requires the House of Representatives to be elected by the people,
but prior to the ratification of the 17th amendment allowed the state legislatures
to choose Senators. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII. Because, however, the states had to have a republican form of government
id. art. IV, § 4, the Senators were directly or indirectly accountable to the people.
The idea was to make members of Congress personally responsible to the people.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
clude a larger portion of the population-until a half century ago
when, members of Congress and Presidents of both parties began
to evade Article I's foundational purpose. They devised and used
new ways of drafting legislation that let them take the credit for
promises of good news while avoiding the blame when govern-
ment produces bad results. With five key tricks, elected officials
now avoid accounting to us for many unpopular consequences.
Part I of my analysis argues that Article I's purpose of making
politically accountable officials personally responsible for conse-
quences is vital to the success and endurance of the republic. Part
II shows how elected officials began to evade such personal re-
sponsibility a half century ago. Part III explains how this evasion
of personal responsibility has led to bumptious promises, failed
policies, and spiraling distrust of government as well as polariza-
tion, gridlock, and the increased influence of special interests. The
ensuing distrust set the stage for outsider candidates uch as Ber-
nie Sanders and Donald Trump. Whatever the fate of the Trump
presidency, the distrust is likely to build so long as the tricks con-
tinue. Part IV proposes a statute, the Honest Deal Act, which
would change the ground rules of legislative politics to force
elected officials to once again shoulder personal responsibility for
consequences. We cannot stop the tricks by broadening the pow-
ers of the President, constitutional adjudication, or constitutional
amendments. Part V argues that it is possible, surprising as it
might seem, to get elected officials to enact a statute that forces
them to shoulder responsibility.
I. ARTICLE I'S PURPOSE OF IMPOSING PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
IS CRITICAL
The people who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787
to draft a constitution for the United States were not all-
knowing, but they did respond sensibly to the challenge of
finding a way that a population with clashing interests could
get along. They put at the heart of the country's new govern-
ment a legislative process in which a House of Representatives
and a Senate whose members would both represent different
constituencies and made them personally responsible for the
664 [Vol. 40
How to Salvage Article I
consequences of their legislative decisions by requiring them to
publish the "Yeas and Nays" on controversial matters.4
The Constitution assigned to this legislative process the most
pivotal decisions, such as decisions to spend the people's mon-
ey, take the people's money through taxes, or incur debt.'
Those assignments put these legislators, including the Presi-
dent when acting under Article I,6 in the middle of such con-
flicts as those between constituents who want more money
from the government, constituents who do not want to pay
more taxes to the government, and constituents who oppose
debt because they fear that it will require cutting spending cuts
or increasing taxes in the future.
The legislators would thus be personally responsible for both
the popular and unpopular consequences of their decisions.
That, in turn would tend to generate open debate. If, for exam-
ple, citizens of one city pressed their representatives to get
Congress to spend money to improve their harbor, those repre-
sentatives might run up against other representatives whose
constituents would resent the cost and might garner support
from still-other representatives whose constituents wanted to
ship goods through the improved harbor.7 Congress would
thus collect information from far afield about the consequences
of proposed legislative actions. So, however legislators re-
solved a controversial issue, the clash between them would
tend to make evident to both representatives and constituents
who would gain and who would lose from the proposed action
and in what ways.
Consider now the manifold advantages potential in a form of
government in which politically accountable officials are re-
sponsible for both the popular and unpopular consequences of
the pivotal decisions.
A. A republican form of government
The Declaration of Independence held that governments de-
rive "their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed."'
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 3.
5. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
6. Id. art. 1, § 7.
7. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
8. U.S CONST. art. 1, § 8.
No. 3]1 665
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The personal responsibility of accountable officials for both
popular and unpopular consequences rested the federal gov-
ernment upon the consent of the governed.
B. Careful attention to the public interest
The Framers were famously concerned about "factions," by
which they meant special interests that, unless checked, would
hijack government for selfish purposes.9 Personal responsibility
for both popular and unpopular consequences would mean
that, the Framers hoped, faction would check faction."o
This hope was borne out to a substantial extent. The open
debate between clashing interests, together with the personal
responsibility of legislators for both benefits to one group of
voters and burdens on another group of voters would give
them strong incentives to take into account the interests of both
groups. This was the case, for example, during the early 1800s
when domestic manufacturers of cloth wanted Congress to set
high tariffs on imported cloth to protect them from foreign
competition." Others opposed higher tariffs because they
would increase the price of cloth, and they told their represent-
atives so. These representatives, as Daniel Webster observed at
the time, were "afraid of their constituents."12 Congress ulti-
mately produced legislation that balanced the interests of both
manufacturers and purchasers.
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majori-
ty or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common im-
pulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.").
10. Id. at 84 ("The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the
other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the
Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must se-
cure the national councils against any danger from that source.").
11. 42 ANNALS OF CONG. 3124-28 (1824) (reporting a memorial "[o]f sundry
manufacturers, mechanics, and friends to national industry .... .").
12. Letter from Daniel Webster to Isaac P. Davis (Apr. 11, 1825), in THE PRIVATE
CORRESPONDENCE OF DANIEL WEBSTER 383, 383 (Fletcher Webster ed., 1857).
13. See MARK THORNTON & ROBERT EKELUND, TARIFFS, BLOCKADES, AND INFLA-
TION: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CIVIL WAR 20 (2004).
666 [Vol. 40
How to Salvage Article I
C. An informed electorate
The drama of open debates would also educate citizens
about the choices facing the government, even those who did
not take to schooling in classrooms. The people desired this
education. Once the states ratified the Constitution, voters in-
sisted on transparency in the political process. For example,
when the Senate violated the Constitution by keeping its pro-
ceedings secret, public pressure forced it to relent. As historian
and professor Robert Wiebe stated, "The anger at secrecy, the
demand for openness, was a functional response to situations
that made democracy impossible."14 In the decades after the
Constitution was ratified, Congresses actually voted upon the
great issues of their era, deciding the law itself on hot-button
issues such as tariffs.'" Legislators took positions on the hard
choices; constituents understood.16 The Constitution had made
the government a drama.
Desire to read about the drama contributed to an upsurge in
literacy. From 1800 to 1840, literacy rates among white adults
increased from 75 percent to around 95 percent in the North
and from 50 percent to 80 percent in the South.' With a largely
literate public, the United States had more newspapers in 1822
than any other country despite its smaller population." Ac-
cording to historian and professor Daniel Walker Howe, "For-
eign visitors marveled at the extent of public awareness even in
remote and provincial areas."19
D. A virtuous circle
The open debate informing the public of who would gain
and who would lose from a legislative proposal would tend to
bring some moderation of demands on government. Given
human nature, however, there would still be disagreements,
14. ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY 68 (1995).
15. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT 272-73 (2007).
16. WIEBE, supra note 14, at 21 ("By the late 1820's, as Alexis de Tocqueville not-
ed, it was already American practice in politics to 'strip off . .. whatever conceals
it from sight, in order to view it more closely and in the broad light of day.'"); id.
at 576.
17. Id. at 67.
18. HOWE, supra note 15, at 227.
19. Id. at 231.
No. 3]1 667
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but, because Congress would resolve the disagreements in the
open with consequences in public view, legislators would usu-
ally be required to balance conflicting interests and voters
could generally accept the system as fair. Win some; lose some.
The Economist approvingly summarized the viewpoint of Nobel
Prize-winning political economist James M. Buchanan as fol-
lows: "A democratic system can maintain legitimacy despite
rancorous politics if broad agreement exists on the fairness of
the underlying rules [of decision]."20
The circle of repeated demand, feedback, moderation, bal-
ancing, decision, and acceptance induced by the responsibility
of representatives would tend to foster virtue. This virtuous
circle could, in the best of times, put the goodness in peoples'
hearts into the heart of government. There were, of course, the
worst of times, such as the Civil War. Yet, despite clashing in-
terests, the nation not only held together, but its Congress
could legislate on such sharply contested issues as tariffs in the
early 1800s and civil rights in the early 1960s.21
II. How LEGISLATORS CAME TO EVADE PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Ironically, the skirting of Article I's purpose came from the suc-
cess it helped to produce. In the mid-1960s, the federal govern-
ment seemed capable of working wonders. It had gotten the
country through the Great Depression, won World War II, in-
vented the atomic bomb, built the interstate highway system,
came to preside over the world's richest economy, and enacted
meaningful civil rights legislation. Such successes understandably
led voters to want Washington to deal with additional problems
such as pollution and haphazard health care for the poor and el-
derly. Yet voters, of course, preferred not to feel the burdens re-
quired to satisfy their wants. That is human nature. Besides, as I
can attest from witnessing the inception of the "Great Society,"




21. See David Schoenbrod, We Have a Dream, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 11, 14 (2014).
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many people thought that they would not have to feel burdens
when they had a wonder-working government.
In this context, politicians came to sincerely embrace theories
that made it seem possible to provide benefits without the bur-
dens needed to deliver the benefits -that is, to bestow some-
thing for nothing or very little. One theory: setting strict dead-
lines to make the air healthy would force industry to invent
technologies that would make it feasible to meet the dead-
lines.22 In fact, the wishing-will-make-it-so theories usually fell
short. An example: meeting the deadlines in the 1970 Clean Air
Act would have required taking most of the cars off the road in
southern California.23 Instead of confessing error, however, leg-
islators from both parties quietly lobbied the EPA not to im-
pose unpopular burdens and then publicly blamed the EPA for
failing to deliver healthy air on schedule and for those burdens
it did impose.24
Once Congress began to overpromise, there was no going back.
A new way of legislating had begun that changed legislators' per-
sonal incentives. To promise good news while avoiding the blame
for bad results, members of Congress and Presidents devised and
used five key tricks. Here they are very briefly described.
A. The Money Trick
The money trick lets members of Congress and Presidents get
credit for tax cuts and spending increases while shifting the blame
for the inevitable tax increases and spending cuts to their succes-
sors in office when the deficits and debt will otherwise become
unsustainable. President Franklin Roosevelt and Congress did not
play the money trick when they established Social Security in
1935.25 They took responsibility for both the benefits and the bur-
dens, including taxes on employers and employees fully suffi-
ciently to pay the pensions promised into the future. In contrast,
22. See David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean
Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 813-14 (1983) (discussing the enactment of the 1970
Clean Air Act with mandatory goals as a means to develop better technology).
23. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON
23-28, 39-51 (2005).
24. Schoenbrod, supra note 22, at 774 ("As 1977 approached, it became increas-
ingly evident that the deadlines would not be met in many locales." (citing
COMM'N ON AIR QUALITY, TO BREATHE CLEAR AIR 3 (1981) (explaining the failure
to meet deadlines due to the inadequacy of certain state regulations.))).
25. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620.
No. 3]1 669
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when President Lyndon Johnson and Congress established Medi-
care in 1965,26 they took credit for the popular health coverage for
the aged but shifted blame for raising some of the necessary reve-
nue to their successors in office. President Richard Nixon and
Congress acted similarly when they increased Social Security pen-
sions shortly before the 1972 election.27
B. The Debt Guarantee Trick
The debt guarantee trick lets members of Congress and Pres-
idents get support from the too-big-to-fail financial giants
whose profits politicians increase by guaranteeing their debts
without charging market-based fees for the guarantees. Mem-
bers of Congress and Presidents shift the blame for the inevita-
ble bailouts to their successors in office when the speculation
encouraged by the cheap debt guarantees triggers fiscal crises
and economic crashes. The debt guarantee trick began to come
on strong in the 1960s. Previously, when President Franklin
Roosevelt and Congress established the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation in 1933,28 they limited the guarantees to
$2,500 per depositor. So the FDIC and thus the government
would not guarantee the debts that banks owed to major de-
positors and other large investors who lent money to the banks.
Because these debts would still be at risk, investors would de-
mand higher interest rates from banks that took more risk and
refuse to lend at all to those that took much more risk. This ap-
proach protected depositors of limited funds without the
means to gauge the riskiness of their bank, yet gave banks a
powerful incentive to control their appetite for risk. In contrast,
when President Johnson and Congress established the Fannie
Mae as a private corporation in 1968,29 they implicitly guaran-
teed all of its debts. In time, it was clear to large investors that
26. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286.
27. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329. This
brief description of the trick is drawn from DAVID SCHOENBROD, DC CONFIDEN-
TIAL: INSIDE THE FIVE TRICKS OF WASHINGTON 57-62 (2017).
28. Glass-Steagall Act, § 7, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933).
29. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, §§ 801-810, Pub. L. No. 90-
448, 82 Stat. 476, 536-46.
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the federal government essentially guaranteed all the debts of
too-big-to-fail financial giants. 3o
C. The Federal Mandate Trick
The federal mandate trick lets members of Congress and Presi-
dents get credit for benefits they coerce state and local govern-
ment to deliver, but shift the blame for the burdens required to
deliver those benefits to state and local officials. The federal man-
date trick rose to prominence in the 1970s. Previously, when Con-
gress and Presidents placed conditions on federal grants, it was
generally to ensure that the purposes of the grant were achieved,
such as requiring that federally-funded highways must be solidly
constructed, or to enforce constitutional rights. In 1995, President
Clinton stated, "Before 1964, the number of explicit mandates
from the Congress on state and local governments was zero," but
"on the day I took office [January 20, 1993] there were at least 172
separate pieces of legislation that impose requirements on state
and local government."31
D. The Regulation Trick
The regulation trick lets members of Congress and Presi-
dents get credit for granting rights to regulatory protection, but
shift to federal agencies the blame for the burdens required to
vindicate those rights and the failures to deliver the protection
promised. The regulation trick began around 1970. Previously,
Congress and Presidents either enacted regulations themselves
through the Article I process or told agencies to promulgate the
regulations in statutes that said to agencies, in essence, "Here's
a problem, solve it." Such broad delegations gave the agency
most of the credit for the benefits as well as the blame for the
burdens.32 In contrast, Congress found a way to get credit for
30. This brief description of the trick is drawn from SCHOENBROD, supra note 27,
at 62-64, 111-22.
31. William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Unfunded Mandates Refort Act
of 1995 (Mar. 22, 1995), reprinted in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, 1995, at 381, 382 (1996). This brief descrip-
tion of the trick is drawn from SCHOENBROD, supra note 27, at 65-70.
32. While a few law professors suppose that delegation of rulemaking power
does not let members of Congress shift blame, the weight of the political science
literature is to the contrary. See David Schoenbrod, Statutory Junk, 66 EMORY L.J.
ONLINE 2023 (2017). Although delegation does shift blame to officials appointed
No. 3]1 671
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the benefits, but shift blame for the burdens and the failures to
deliver the benefits. With the 1970 Clean Air Act," for example,
President Nixon and Congress purported to grant iron-clad
rights to regulatory protection (thus reaping credit) and told
the agency to impose the duties needed to vindicate those
rights (thus shifting blame).3 4
E. The War Trick
The war trick lets members of Congress evade responsibility
for wars that might later prove controversial. Until 1950, the
tradition was that wars were either declared or authorized by
statute, with the great bulk of wars authorized by statute. This
tradition made both Presidents and Congress responsible for
war. Then, in 1950, President Harry Truman launched the Ko-
rean War without seeking authorization from Congress. In
1973, responding to the unpopularity of wars in Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution."
It purported to block wars that are neither declared nor author-
ized by Congress. The Resolution, however, has been interpret-
ed as providing a loophole that allows Presidents to avoid
seeking approval from Congress, and Presidents use this loop-
hole when Congress might balk at approving the war.3 6 Con-
gress has found it convenient to avoid closing the loophole. In
1995, then-Senator Joseph Biden stated that legislators have
failed to fix the War Powers Resolution because "they do not
have the political courage to take a stand on whether or not we
should go to war." 7 So members of Congress use the statute to
take credit for supposedly wanting to take responsibility for
going to war, while colluding with the President to evade re-
sponsibility for wars that might later prove controversial.
Members of Congress can thus march in the parade if the war
by the President, the President who signs the statute also largely evades most of
the blame. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 27, at 74-75.
33. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1970).
34. This brief description of the trick is drawn from SCHOENBROD, supra note 27,
at 70-74.
35. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
36. See, e.g., Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op.
O.L.C. 327, 334-35 (1995).
37. 141 CONG. REC. S3971 (1995) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
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proves popular, but put the entire blame on the President if the
war proves unpopular."
Voters, of course, understand that trickery is going on, but
cannot see the sleights of hand that allow the legislators to take
credit but shift blame. Indeed, legislators cater to constituents'
concerns about the trickery through more trickery. Take a bill
that the House passed on January 5, 2017, the Regulations from
the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act ("REINS Act").39 The ti-
tle, which suggests that the root of the problem is aggressive
agencies rather than blame-shifting legislation, shows that
blame-shifting is again at work. According to the Republican
leadership of the House Judiciary Committee, the REINS Act
"requires that federal agencies submit major regulations (those
that cost the economy $100 million or more) to Congress for
approval" but no mention is made of regulations that cut the
costs of compliance."
The REINS Act's sponsors have fashioned it to sound anti-
regulatory rather than pro-accountability, which minimizes
the chance that it would survive a filibuster in the Senate.
The Act's failure would allow its sponsors to strike an anti-
regulatory pose popular with their constituents without ever
having to vote against specific regulatory protections that
their constituents want. No less opportunistically, Demo-
crats are for promises of regulatory protection without hav-
ing to vote for regulatory burdens.
III. How EVADING PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS BROKEN
GOVERNMENT
By allowing legislators to evade personal responsibility,
the tricks rob us of critical advantages that we should get
from Article I.
38. This brief description of the trick is drawn from SCHOENBROD, supra note 27,
at 130-37.
39. H.R. 26, 115th Cong. (2017).
40. Press Release, H. Judiciary Comm., Goodlatte and Collins Praise House Pas-
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A. From a republican form of government o a republican fagade of
government
The tricks deny us a republican form of government by
breaking the link between actions and responsibility for their
consequences upon which representation depends. We have
elections without accountability. By more than a two-to-one
margin, voters believe that the federal government does not
have the consent of the governed.41
B. From careful attention to the public interest to carelessness and
worse
By insulating members of Congress from blame for unwisely
entering wars, the war trick short-circuits the debate that ought
to take place before the nation commits itself to war. This has
led to many ill-conceived military enterprises.?
By insulating members of Congress and Presidents from
blame for the burdens needed to deliver on the promises on
taxing, spending, debt guarantees, mandates, and regulation,
the other tricks encourage legislators to make grandiose prom-
ises without regard to the consequences for the public. This
means that they fail to consider whether government can in
fact fulfill the promises, whether the promises are worth the
burdens, and how to minimize the burdens needed to deliver
them. Instead of framing legislation to deliver the most benefit
to the constituents with the least burden, they frame legislation
to deliver the most credit to themselves with the least blame to
themselves." Framing legislation to maximize the net benefit to
constituents would require legislators to do hard work. Fram-
ing legislation to maximize the net benefit for themselves re-
quires no hard work for legislators because they are past mas-
ters at optics.
It is thus unsurprising that legislators have cut the amount of
time they spend in Washington and devote little of that time to
legislation. They spend about as much time on legislation as de-
41. See 19% Think Federal Government Has Consent of the Governed, RASMUSSEN
REP. (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/
general-politics/april2014/19_thinkfederal-government hasconsentofthe_
governed [https://perma.cc/H4WP-NEEV].
42. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 27, at 136-37.
43. See id. at 50-53.
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voted weekend golfers spend on the golf course.4 They have also
greatly increased the portion of their budgets that go to the dis-
trict offices that provide constituent service as opposed to the
staffs in Washington assigned to help them with Article I legisla-
tive work.45 The biggest share of the legislators' time in Washing-
ton is spent on soliciting campaign contributions. 6 As political
scientists have found, blame-shifting allows legislators to benefit
big campaign contributors at the expense of the general public
without losing votes at the next election.47 Conservatives as well
as liberals argue that the tricks have encouraged policies that have
benefited the rich at the expense of average citizens.
C. From an informed electorate to a deceived electorate
Some observers dismiss voters as ignorant and therefore
rightly left in the dark. Yet, others have found, the trickery
helps to cause ignorance.41 As the legal philosopher and profes-
sor Jeremy Waldron wrote, those who dismiss voters as igno-
rant "have done democracy a great disservice" by portraying
the public's seeming lack of understanding as an inevitable fact
rather than as "the consequence of something comparable to
malfeasance in office or corruption or electoral fraud"49 -in
other words, the tricks.
D. From a virtuous circle to a vicious circle
The perverse consequences of trickery have included distrust
of government. According to Pew Research, in 1964, before the
trickery began, 76 percent of voters trusted Washington to "do
the right thing almost always or most of the time.""o That im-
pressive figure fell to a woeful 19 percent in 2015.11
44. See id. at 89-90.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 90-92.
48. See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS (2010).
49. Jeremy Waldron, Accountability: Fundamental to Democracy 28 (NYU Sch. of L.
Pub. L. Paper No. 14-13, Apr. 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2410812 [https://perma.cc/UR66-5Q4Y].
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The great bulk of American people believe that Washington in-
siders have tricked them. By a four to one margin, voters agreed
with the statement in Trump's inaugural address that "a small
group in our nation's capital has reaped the rewards of govern-
ment while the people have borne the cost."5 2 The Rasmussen poll
showed that large majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and in-
dependents agreed." It is thus unsurprising that Bernie Sanders
and Donald Trump, both running as outsiders, did better than
expected in the 2016 presidential primaries and so many voted to
"drain the swamp" in the 2016 general election.
Whatever the fate of the Trump presidency, unless the legis-
lators stop shirking their Article I duties and the accountability
that comes with them, an increasingly resentful electorate will
bring an increasingly erratic government. For example, then-
Judge Stephen Breyer showed how something-for-nothing en-
vironmental statutes produced a "vicious circle," by telling the
EPA to produce benefits by imposing burdens that the legisla-
tors failed to acknowledge in passing the statutes.54 When the
agency attempted to implement the statutes and constituents
voiced objections to the burdens, legislators pressured adminis-
trators not to impose those burdens. This, in turn, meant that
the agency failed to deliver the promised environmental quali-
ty. As a result, environmental advocates blasted the agency and
complained to members of Congress, who responded by order-
ing the agency in yet-more-absolute statutes to protect the en-
vironment, still of course without taking responsibility for the
required burdens. The result of this vicious circle, Breyer
showed, is that the EPA sometimes fails to stop major envi-
ronmental harms for modest costs, instead stopping trivial en-
vironmental harms at huge costs.55 Not only in the environ-
mental arena but in general, something-for-nothing legislation
has turned the virtuous circle into a vicious circle by promising
52. Voters Strongly Share Trump's Criticism of D.C. Establishment, RASMUSSEN REP.
(Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/general
politics/january_2017/votersstrongly-share-trump-s-criticism of d-c establish
ment [https://perma.cc/F3F7-Y3VG].
53. See id.
54. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 3-54 (1995).
55. See id. at 21-23.
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benefits the government fails to deliver and burdens of which
legislators fail to forewarn us. As a result, all sides feel cheated.
Voters, of course, know that the promises of something for
nothing, or for very little, are too good to be true, and so we
sense that trickery is going on even though we do not quite
understand how the trickery works. The sense that cheating is
going on negates the broad agreement on the fairness of a
democratic system that has the ability to be legitimate despite
rancorous politics. With cheating in the air, people grab for
what they can get.
By using the tricks, Congress fails to set realistic expecta-
tions and thereby provide a context in which society can
prosper and its members can individually pursue happiness.
To the contrary, Congress tells everyone, in essence, that he
or she is entitled to prevail, much like the corrupt officials in
The Hunger Games tell each and every combatant, "May the
odds be ever in your favor!"5 6 The conflicting expectations
that Congress creates set up our government to disappoint.
No wonder we distrust the federal government.
Moreover, by failing to face up to the inevitable trade-offs be-
tween benefits and burdens, Congress fails to educate voters
about what makes sense and what is fair. Legislators tell us
what they are against rather than what they are for. Most legis-
lators say they are against killing children with pollution. Most
legislators also say they are against killing jobs with regulation.
Which they say depends upon whom they are talking to. Such
absolutism is possible in sound bites or tricky statutes, but not
in deciding how much to cut emissions of a pollutant, where
trade-offs between health and jobs are inevitable. Yet, only
when government leaders focus on the concrete rather than the
abstract can they tap into our shared sense of fairness.17
56. SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES 19 (2012) (emphasis omitted).
57. Ralph Nader described this sense of fairness as "the common core of peo-
ple's humanity, which finds expression in factual realities, and the many senses of
fairness and fair play that appear right where people are interacting every day-
their workplaces, neighborhoods, marketplaces, public spaces, and the all-
encompassing physical environment." RALPH NADER, UNSTOPPABLE 16 (2014).
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The distrust of the federal government is often blamed on grid-
lock and polarization, but the trust steeply declined in the 1960s
and 1970s, long before the gridlock and polarization set in."
IV. HOW THE LEGISLATORS COULD STOP THE SHIRKING
We cannot escape the tricks of Congress by looking to Presi-
dents for salvation. As already noted in passing, Presidents
have often instigated the tricks that Congress uses. With the
power to veto bills, the President usually has more power over
legislation than anyone and therefore more responsibility. As
the legislator-in-chief, the President is the trickster-in-chief.
The tricks poison the entire government rather than just the
legislative branch. The executive branch's primary job is to exe-
cute the statutes legislated, and the judicial branch's primary
job is to apply those statutes in litigation. Statutes once gave
the executive more leeway, but to take full advantage of the
blame-shifting tricks, the statutes enacted since the 1960s im-
pose so many precisely specified duties on the executive
branch that it has much less leeway to rescue us from the bad
decisions that statutes make. For example, in December, 2008,
the newly elected President, Barack Obama, asked Congress to
pass a bill to stimulate an economy in the depths of recession
by putting people to work on "shovel-ready" projects repairing
roads and other deteriorated infrastructure.5 9 Later, however,
he lamented that "there's no such thing as shovel-ready pro-
jects."60 The White House reported in February 2014 that the
government could devote only 3.6 percent of the $832 billion
program to fixing bridges, roads, and the rest of our transpor-
tation system.6 1 As Philip Howard explained: "[T]he President
had no authority to build anything, and most of the money got
58. See Public Trust in Government, supra note 50 (demonstrating increases and
declines in public trust of government).
59. Michael D. Shear, Obama Lesson: 'Shovel Ready' Not So Ready, N. Y. TIMES
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diverted to a temporary bailout of the states. The money was
basically wasted."62 Howard showed that the President's hands
were tied again and again by old statutes.6 1
Presidents are often tempted to circumvent Congress by
usurping the legislative powers that the Constitution assigns to
Congress. In this, commentators on the left and the right see
grave danger. For example, on the left, Bruce Ackerman, a
prominent progressive professor of law and political science
who had vigorously defended the growth of executive power
during the New Deal, expressed alarm at more recent changes
in our government. Writing in 2010, he warned that although
Presidents try to dress their unilateralism in high purpose:
[I]n America, it is not enough to be right. Before you can im-
pose your views on the polity, you have to convince your
fellow citizens that you're right. That's what democracy is
all about. So it makes good sense to require the president to
gain the support of Congress even when his vision is moral-
ly compelling. He should not be allowed to lead the nation
on a great leap forward through executive decree.6 4
Nor do the American people want their President to usurp
the powers of Congress. Although opinion polls for decades
have reflected disapproval of Congress, the public continues to
believe that Congress, rather than the President, should make
the major policy choices.6 1 I share that belief, because systemat-
ic studies show that nations with strong executives and weak
legislatures tend to suppress political liberty, go to war more
frequently, and suffer from more corruption.66
So we must fix the legislative process, but we cannot do so
by enforcing the Constitution in court. Some of the tricks, such
as the money trick, plainly violate no constitutional structure.
62. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE RULE OF NOBODY: SAVING AMERICA FROM DEAD
LAWS AND BROKEN GOVERNMENT 156 (2014).
63. See id.
64. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 39
(2010). Posner and Vermeule's The Executive Unbound is a spirited defense of the
President being unbound by legislative power. ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VER-
MEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010). Their
argument is deeply flawed. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 27, at 74-75.
65. See e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, THE IMPRINT OF CONGRESS (forthcoming 2017).
66. F. H. BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING: THE RISE OF CROWN GOVERN-
MENT IN AMERICA 181-234, 315-320 (2014).
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The federal mandate trick has been stopped in court, but only
once until 2012.67
Nor can we feasibly stop the tricks in court by amending the
Constitution. Take, for example, the decades-long drive to amend
the Constitution to limit budget deficits. Whether such an
amendment is good economics, it is unlikely to succeed. Such an
amendment has never gotten the required two-thirds approval in
both houses of Congress needed to submit it to the states for rati-
fication. Even if it were to get this approval, it is unlikely that it
would then be ratified by three-quarters of the states, as is neces-
sary to amend the Constitution.68 The balanced budget amend-
ment does, however, let some elected officials strike a pose in fa-
vor of fiscal responsibility without actually having to take the
blame for raising taxes or cutting spending.
The good news is that, even under the existing Constitution,
the Republic avoided the five tricks for over a century and a
half. Tradition impelled legislators to act in ways that gave
them responsibility for consequences. That tradition got swept
away in the middle of the twentieth century. We should not
necessarily go back to the old tradition. Today's times are dif-
ferent. We need a new tradition suitable for our times that will
stop the five tricks.
To that end, my recent book, DC Confidential: Inside the Five
Tricks of Washington, proposes a statute, the Honest Deal
Act. 69 It would change the ground rules of legislative politics
to force elected officials to shoulder blame for unpopular
consequences. Here, in a nutshell, is how each of the five
tricks lets them shift blame and the way that the Honest Deal
Act would stop the blame shifting.
The money trick lets members of Congress and Presidents shift
to their successors in office the blame for the tax increases and
benefit cuts that will result from current policy. Much as the Truth
67. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519, 632 (2012). Jonathan
Adler argues that NFIB, even though framed as a response to extreme and patent
coercion, may have an impact in some other instances. Jonathan H. Adler & Na-
thaniel Steward, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? Coercion, Cooperative Federal-
ism and Conditional Spending after NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671, 721-22
(2017).
68. U.S. CONST. art V.
69. The following discussion of the Honest Deal Act is based on SCHOENBROD,
supra note 27, at 139-60.
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in Lending Act requires lenders to disclose to prospective bor-
rowers how much they will have to pay in the future,70 the Honest
Deal Act would require government to disclose to voters in the
present the average cost per family of the spending cuts or tax
increases needed for it to make ends meet in the long run and
how much that cost changed in the last Congress.7 '
The debt guarantee trick lets members of Congress and Pres-
idents shift to their successors in office the blame for the fiscal
crises and economic misery that will result from current debt
guarantees that increase profits on Wall Street. The Honest
Deal Act would charge the businesses that benefit from the
debt guarantees market-based fees. The market would drive
the fee up when a firm takes more risk, thereby cutting its prof-
its when it take risks that could help lead to a fiscal crisis.72
The federal mandate trick lets federal officials shift to state offi-
cials the blame for the burdens needed to deliver the benefits for
which the federal officials take credit. The Honest Deal Act would
trigger roll call votes on the most controversial new mandates and
thus make members of Congress responsible for the burdens that
they impose through state and local government.7 1
The regulation trick lets current members of Congress and Pres-
idents shift blame to federal agencies for the burdens required to
vindicate rights to regulatory protection and the failures to deliver
the promised regulatory protection. Implementing the proposal
by James Landis, the New Deal expert, as fleshed out by then
judge Stephen Breyer, the Honest Deal Act would require mem-
bers of Congress to cast roll call votes on major regulatory chang-
es, whether to strengthen or weaken regulation.74
The war trick lets members of Congress shift to the President
blame for wars that prove unpopular. The Honest Deal Act would
require members of Congress to vote on wars at the outset.7 1
These proposals do not tilt for or against spending or taxing,
benefits or burdens, war or peace, or any of the rest; rather,
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-51 (2012).
71. Id. at 139-45
72. Id. at 145-48.
73. Id. at 148-50.
74. Id. at 150-56.
75. Id. at 156-60.
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they tilt toward making elected officials accountable to us for
the consequences they impose.76
V. How WE CAN GET THE LEGISLATORS TO GIVE US AN HONEST
DEAL
Getting the Honest Deal Act passed looks impossible when
we blame our broken government on politicians currying favor
with special interests on the left or the right. Such special inter-
ests can seem invincible because, as Professor Mancur Olsen
famously taught, the small number of their members-
sometimes only a single monopolistic firm-makes it easier for
them to organize to wield political influence.77 This appearance
of impossibility rests, however, on two false premises: (1) that
special interests can't be defeated and (2) the fault lies exclu-
sively with members of Congress and Presidents.
The first premise is false because the general public can some-
times prevail over special interests. As Professor Olson wrote:
[I]deas certainly do make a difference. May we not then rea-
sonably expect, if special interests are (as I have daimed)
harmful to economic growth, full employment, coherent
government, equal opportunity, and social mobility, that
students of the matter will become increasingly aware of this
as time goes on? And that the awareness eventually will
spread to larger and larger proportions of the population?
And that this wider awareness will greatly limit the losses
from the special interests? That is what I expect, at least
when I am searching for a happy ending.78
Ideas are indeed what allowed the broad public interest to pre-
vail over special interests in the 1970s. The idea that government
should protect the public from pollution brought regulation de-
spite imposing large costs on the well-organized interests in the
auto, coal, and other industries. And the idea that the government
regulation of airlines, railroads, telephone, and other companies
76. For a description of the terms of the Honest Deal Act and a detailed explana-
tion for its design, see DC-CONFIDENTIAL, http://www.dc-confidential.org
[https://perma.cc/PWP4-S9V3].
77. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
78. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 237 (2008).
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was actually enabling these firms to charge inflated prices
brought deregulation that has saved consumers huge sums.
I wrote DC Confidential to spread the idea that the trickery
does us great harm. The time is ripe for the public to see the
harm that five tricks do to us. As noted in Part III, distrust of
the federal government had reached an all-time high in 2015.
Although the public generally does not yet understand the
sleights of hand that enable these tricks to work, we have
glimpsed the harm that comes from them. To mollify our an-
ger, Congress has passed a succession of statutes:
* Anger about unauthorized or sloppily-authorized
military campaigns led to the War Powers Resolu-
tion in 1973.79
* Anger about deficits led to the budget-balancing stat-
utes of the 1980sso and 1990s.11
* Anger about mandates to states and localities led to
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.82
* Anger about regulation led to the Congressional Re-
view Act of 1996.8
* Anger about bailouts of financial giants led to
Dodd-Frank.84
These statutes have not, however, stopped the tricks. The
problem was that the citizens voicing complaints to Congress
79. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). For more information about the ori-
gins of the War Powers Resolution, see War Powers Legislation: Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong. 58 (1971) (statement of Sen. J. W. Ful-
bright); id. at 125 (statement of Sen. Claiborne Pell); id. at 261 (statement of Sen.
Robert Taft, Jr.); id. at 336 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias).
80. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037.
81. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388. For
origins of budget balancing statutes, see, for example, Dick Thornburgh, Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings and the Balanced Budget Amendment: A Page of History, 25 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 615 (1988).
82. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48. For origins of the Unfunded Mandate Reform
Act, see 141 CONG. REC. 7, S833-34 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bob
Dole).
83. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996). For origins of the Congressional
Review Act, see, for example, James T. 0' Reilly, EPA Rulemaking after the 204th
Congress: Death from Four Near-Fatal Wounds?, 3 ENVT'L L. 1, 5-10 (1996).
84. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumper Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). For information on the origins of Dodd-Frank, see
SCHOENBROD, supra note 27, at 120.
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did not insist on a specific design for new ground rules suffi-
cient to stop the tricks. With the design left to Congress, it pro-
duced reforms that were more apparent than real, at least in
the long run.5 My book suggests specific changes to the
ground rules of legislative politics sufficient to stop the tricks. I
have dealt with these five tricks together because that shifts the
focus from their adverse policy consequences in specific con-
texts to being cheated. Being cheated gets the blood boiling.
The second false premise behind the notion that we cannot
stop the tricks is that the fault lies exclusively with politicians.
We, in fact, participate in cheating ourselves. Many politicians
would embrace honesty if we only made clear that we prefer
honesty to being falsely promised something for nothing. To
see why politicians who so often duck blame might enact a
statute that forces them to accept responsibility, we need a
fuller understanding of why they behave as they do, for it will
show our own part in their behavior.
Many people go into politics in the hope of exercising power
responsibly, but find that they must engage in trickery in order
to have power to exercise. The reason is, as suggested in Part II,
many voters have become accustomed to being promised
something for nothing, and will reject politicians who fail to
promise it. Tim Penny wrote, after serving in the House as a
Democratic representative from Minnesota, "Voters routinely
punish lawmakers who ... challenge them to face unpleasant
truths." 6 So legislators are "running scared," as the political
scientist and professor Anthony King put it.17
Thus, legislators found that using tricks was a recipe for get-
ting reelected, and showing other legislators how to do the
same was a recipe for getting the power to shape legislation
within Congress. When today's incumbents came to Congress,
85. Members of Congress played a critical role in designing these illusory
ground-rule statutes. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSBILITY: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH, 48-49 (1993); PAUL L. Pos-
NER, THE POLITICS OF UNFUNDED MANDATES 180-207 (1998); The Mysteries of the
Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2176-83 (2009).
86. TIMOTHY PENNY & MAJOR GARRETT, COMMON CENTS: A RETIRING SIx-TERM
CONGRESSMAN REVEALS How CONGRESS REALLY WORKS-AND WHAT WE MUST
DO TO FIX IT 72 (1995).




How to Salvage Article I
they found themselves in an institution that was doing busi-
ness through tricks. They had to go along or become irrelevant.
In sum, powerful evolutionary pressures have turned Congress
into the trick-playing institution that it is today.
As a result, we cannot simply get rid of the tricks by voting
against the members of Congress who join in them. Their re-
placements would also feel pressures to deceive voters. So, both
voters and politicians are trapped in a dishonest game. As the say-
ing goes, "Don't hate the player, hate the game." The Honest Deal
Act is a way to change the ground rules of the game.
We can begin to escape the trap by asking politicians to
pledge to pass the Honest Deal Act and faithfully implement it.
An associated webpage8 provides voters with the means to
quickly and easily send such messages. It also provides the
means to ask friends to send such messages.
Taking the pledge would appeal to the part of the many in-
cumbents who went into office hoping to exercise power hon-
orably. True, some legislators may prefer to keep up the trick-
ery and the ridiculous posturing it entails because they believe
that trickery will ease their reelection. Their hunger to get
reelected would, however, similarly force them to support the
Honest Deal Act if many voters wanted them to.
Voters should want them to because the five tricks harm far
more voters than they help. To see why, ask yourself this ques-
tion: do you want your government to be run by officials who
are accountable to us on the basis of sound bites or the conse-
quences of their actions? Incumbents will not have to start tak-
ing responsibility until later, when the necessity to do so will
apply to both parties.
Each one of us who asks politicians to pledge to support the
Honest Deal Act will make a substantial difference, because in
the end it will not take the concern of that many people to tilt
the political balance against the tricks. This response is because
many sorts of politicians -Presidents, governors, mayors, other
state and local officials, and the candidates for these offices-
have reasons to want to stop the tricks.
The Presidents will welcome the Honest Deal Act, except
perhaps for the cure for the war trick, which would deprive
88. DC-CONFIDENTIAL, http://www.dc-confidential.org [https://perma.cc/PWP4-
S9V3].
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them of the power to wage war without securing approval
from Congress. While some legislators find the tricks helpful to
secure their seats for many terms, the President is limited to
two terms and is often frustrated by the unwillingness of Con-
gress to come to grips with pressing issues before those two
terms end. In addition, by pledging to press for passage of the
entire Honest Deal Act, candidates for President can show vot-
ers that they support the accountability that is the prerequisite
for democracy. We have had successful candidates for Presi-
dent who promised a New Deal and a Fair Deal. Now, let us
have one promise an Honest Deal. Governors, mayors, and
other state and local officials will want to stop the federal man-
date trick, which Congress and the Presidents use to shift
blame to them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The need for change is urgent. In 2016, former Indiana Gov-
ernor Mitch Daniels, now the President of Purdue University,
warned that democracy itself is at risk:
A record 1 in 4 young people say that democracy is a "bad
way" to run the country, and an even larger fraction of the citi-
zenry would prefer an authoritarian leader who did not have
to deal with the nuisance of elections .... If national leadership
continues to allow our drift toward a Niagara of debt, until sol-
emn promises are broken as they would then inevitably be, to-
day's sense of betrayal will seem tame. When today's young
Americans learn the extent of the debt burden we have left
them, they may question the premises of our self government,
with good reason. When tomorrows older Americans finally
understand how they have been actively misled about the na-
ture and the reliability of our fundamental social welfare pro-
grams, it may be the last straw breaking the public confidence
on which democracy itself depends.89
Failure to stop the tricks would bring even greater peril than
we already face.
89. Federal Debt: Direction, Drivers and Dangers: Hearing Before U.S. Cong. Joint
Econ. Comm., 114th Cong. (2016), http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/cache/files/
eOc59f8a-c965-416c-b6fl-3ffcd78e343d/daniels-jec-testimony-9-8-16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z8DQ-5V9P] (written testimony).
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